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ABSTRACT
We address the problem of substring searchable encryption. A single
user produces a big stream of data and later on wants to learn the
positions in the string that some patterns occur. Although current
techniques exploit auxiliary data structures to achieve efficient
substring search on the server side, the cost at the user side may be
prohibitive. We revisit the work of substring searchable encryption
in order to reduce the storage cost of auxiliary data structures. Our
solution entails a suffix array based index design, which allows
optimal storage cost O (n) with small hidden factor at the size of
the string n. Moreover, we implemented our scheme and the state
of the art protocol [7] to demonstrate the performance advantage
of our solution with precise benchmark results.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there is a flourish of protocols delegated to run by an
untrusted coalition of servers, systems, services, called hereafter
the cloud. Due to the untrusted nature of the cloud, users seek to
protect the privacy and security of their data with cryptographic
primitives. The cloud on the other hand offers an economy of scale
with the impressive resources it acquires, ranging from software
to hardware. Usually users need to perform a search on their data.
Tailored protocols for secure searchable encryption have been pro-
posed in the literature, whereby single or multiple users upload
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encrypted documents, with some auxiliary data structure called an
index, allowing the cloud to correctly return documents contain-
ing a single, multiple or a boolean function of keywords, without
compromising index, query, and documents privacy.
While keyword based search protocols are quite common in a
large range of applications, they cannot efficiently address all the
possible queries a user submits to the cloud. Substring based queries
have come to the forefront due to the ubiquitousness of devices and
the progress in storage technology. Devices produce a big stream
of data, which needs to be queried later on with substring based
queries. Namely a substring query for a stream of data, consists
of a substring of the stream and the result is the position of the
substring in the big stream, or/and the number of occurrences of
multiple substrings.
Applications. In a health-care application, data enclaves which
hold giant stream of medical information such as DNA sequencing
are asked to answer substring queries by medical labs. The possi-
ble position of a substring in the whole DNA sequence of a single
person gives information about predisposition to diseases. As such,
it is treated as personal sensitive information and should be pro-
tected. Nowadays, the sequencing process is possible thanks to the
progress of computers. Online services offer DNA sequencing to
institutions and individuals. In the logging systems scenario, com-
panies, institutions and organizations produce log data of giant size.
The logs are recorded and uploaded in a cloud infrastructure to take
advantage of the cheap storage space. Log data are often searched to
identify malicious substring patterns. The position of the suspicious
searched string token will act as a bookmark to further download
the logs data, which proceed and succeed that position for further
investigation. Deep packet inspection (DPI) is another application
whereby a gateway, firewall, or Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
on behalf of a user is looking for prohibitive content on a bigger
stream. In general, the vast amount of information renders sub-
string queries a real challenge and reducing the storage cost of the
encrypted index would increase the performance of such services.
Protecting the privacy of the data stream and the substring query,
while allowing an untrusted cloud to correctly answer substring
matching pattern efficiently and securely is not trivial. Following
the searchable encryption approach, separating the data itself from
the index, results in a prohibitive storage index costO (n2), where n
is the size of the stream. The index consists of all possible substrings
of a stream of data of size n and the encrypted data are the positions
of the substring. Recently, the authors in [7] proposed a solution
that asymptotically achieves O (n) storage costs by exploiting the
auxiliary data structure of the suffix tree. However the asymptotic
costs of O (n) hide a constant factor that can be roughly up to 20
[1, 3, 24] for the construction of the suffix tree due to the complexity
of the tree and the extra pointers to traverse a tree. Moreover
the suffix tree based approach leaks unnecessary information that
eventually can reveal all the encrypted positions of the substrings.
Following a different approach other than auxiliary index based
methods, the authors in [12] achieve to hide the extra leakage at the
cost of fixed length substring patterns. The neat of their solution
lies on the design of subset sum problems tailored to the positions of
specific substrings, so as to the cloud can solve it partially. However
this comes at the cost of small constant substring query length
during the execution of the protocol.
Our goal, which launches our research is to reduce the increased
size of index for substring queries, which has to be computed once
and be kept at the cloud during the entire lifetime of the protocol.
Even a small improvement would have big impact as the data to be
indexed for substring queries span to million of elements. Moreover,
besides the cloud side cost cuts, the client will also be positively
affected as the smaller the size of the index it is outsourced, the less
the charges clients commit to the cloud.
Idea. After encrypting the suffix tree of Chase scheme [7], the
encrypted structure leaks a lot of information concerning the inter-
nal structure of the tree as number of leaves, children and double
“touched” branches. The authors suggested a dummy node policy in
order to hide as much information as possible. After constructing
the suffix tree with N nodes, the suffix tree is filled up with 2n − N
internal nodes. To each node with less than σ children, where σ
is the size of the vocabulary, up to σ dummy nodes are appended.
Encrypting all these dummy blocks drastically increases the storage
overhead and subsequently the communication cost of the protocol
for index construction.
Our core idea lies at the properties of a suffix array based index-
ing. A suffix array contains information about the position of each
suffix of a string and has constant size n for a string of n size. In
contrast, the data structure of the suffix tree has no constant size
and can acquire up to 2n nodes, with each node storing informa-
tion about its edges, parent and children nodes, thus increasing
the storage need. By choosing the suffix array we decrease the
storage need for the construction of the index. The second factor,
which allows for less storage and subsequently communication
efficiency is the dummy blocks policy which is used to hide the
structure of the suffix tree in [7]. Our dummy node policy to ob-
scure the encrypted suffix array relies only on the frequency of
the most frequent character. Namely, we fill up the original string
with characters such that the frequency of each character is the
same. However this approach raises a shortcoming when applied
to data sets with skewed frequency distributions such as text based
data sets. We overcome that limitation with a bucketization tech-
nique. Instead of building the index on a single character approach
we explore the idea of grouping together characters consisting a
bucket. Surprisingly our experimental evaluation showed that the
skewed frequencies are diminished and the final storage overhead
for the index is considerably smaller by a factor of 1.8 for text based
datasets.
In this paper we design and analyze a storage efficient Substring
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (S3E) protocol with variable size
of substrings. We follow a different approach from existing tech-
niques that allows us to achieve the efficiency, functional and secu-
rity goals we want. In our technique we exploit a self-indexed data
structure, which allows the cloud to search for substring queries. Its
form resembles the suffix arrays with some additional extra steps.
The main contributions in the paper are summarized as follows:
• Storage efficient Substring Searchable Symmetric Encryption
(S3E): Thanks to the employment of the suffix array, which
achieves a small hidden factor (≈ 4) in the O (n) asymptotic
complexity, compared to the bigger (≈ 20) hidden factor
of the suffix tree, our design presents a storage efficient
substring searchable symmetric encryption protocol.
• Variable substring query length: Our solution allows a dy-
namic issue of substring queries of variable size without the
need of defining a fixed query size beforehand.
• Provably secure. Our scheme is provably secure in the real-
ideal simulation paradigm with similar leakages as the state
of the art scheme in [7].
• Prototype implementation: We implemented our protocol and
the state of the art work in [7]. We performed a real world
comparison of both schemes based on computation time and
communication overhead to build the index and query for a
substring. Our results show a performance advantage of 1.8
storage overhead on text based datasets as the enron email
one.
Outline. In section 2 we introduce the problem this paper ad-
dresses. Afterwards, in section 3 we review similar cryptographic
protocols for substring searchable symmetric encryption. We con-
tinue in section 4 with preliminaries of our solution and the basic
building blocks. In section 5 we illustrate in more details the design
components of our protocol and in section 6 we describe in details
our protocol. We present a thorogh security analysis in Theorem 7.
In section 8 we present some benchmark results and in section 9 a
comparison with state of the art. Finally, we conclude in section 10.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we formalize the problem of string matching. We first
start with the functional requirements of substring matching and
afterwards we present the security requirements of the protocol.
2.1 Functional Requirements
Herewith pattern matching, string matching and substring match-
ing are used interchangeably in this paper. We assume that a string
S is modeled as a one dimension array S[1...n]. A substring is an-
other array T [1...m]. The elements of each array are drawn from
some finite alphanumerical alphabet Σ of size σ = |Σ|. We say that
a substring T occurs in S if there exists s : 1 ≤ s ≤ n −m and
S[s + 1...s +m] = T [1...m], meaning that S[s + j] = T [j], 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Naive algorithms for pattern matching achieve O (n) on search
time and 0 cost on preprocessing. The algorithm simply scans all the
positions i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−m of the string S until it findsm consecutive
matches at a position j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n −m + 1. Trading preprocess-
ing efficiency for better search costs, Robin Karp algorithm [21]
achieves O (n −m + 1) search time and Θ(m) preprocessing amor-
tized cost. In a similar trajectory Knuth-Moris-Pratt [22] has Θ(n)
search complexity and Θ(m) preprocessing time. Boyer-Moore pat-
tern matching technique [2] increases the preprocessing cost at
Θ(m + σ ) in order to have worst case search complexity O (n). Fol-
lowing a different trajectory substring matching techniques achieve
O (m) search time by leveraging a more sophisticated preprocessing
step, in which the suffixes of all substring are computed along with
their positions in the string S , be it suffix tree[25, 34, 35] or suffix
array [24]. Suffix tree though has a more expensive space efficiency
due to the extra information the suffix tree has to keep [1, 3, 17, 24].
This cost is translated to a constant factor that approximates ≈ 20,
which is hidden in the O (n) asymptotic storage cost of the suffix
tree construction. As a first step to relax this storage extra hidden
cost we choose to build upon the suffix array string matching ap-
proach which has a much simpler storage cost which approximates
4n [1].
We redraw upon the queryable encryption syntactical definition
of [7], since we believe it follows a deceptive abstraction. Namely,
the functional definition claims to capture a generic framework
for searchable encryption, in the sense that a query F can be any
function keyword query, or substring query. However, an encrypted
searchable encryption scheme is a more generic protocol, since it
can be used to solve the substring searchable encryption problem
with the encrypted inverted index technique as shown in the intro-
duction. As such, searchable and substring encryption schemes can-
not be addressed by the same definitional framework. Furthermore,
the nature of the problem and the solution for substring queries
drastically varies from keyword searchable encryption, since the
index contains the data and there are not two separate objects,
meaning that the index for substring queries is self-indexed, since
from the index you can recover the underlying data structure. In
contrast in encrypted searchable encryption, there is a clear distinc-
tion between the index, and the data structure that holds the data
(files with keywords). For these reasons we rewrite the functional
definitional framework for substring searchable encryption.
Definition 2.1. A Substring Searchable Symmetric Encryption
scheme (S3E) is a collection of four polynomial time algorithms
(KeyGen,PreProcess, SrchToken, Search) defined as follows:
• k ← KeyGen(1λ ): It is a probabilistic algorithm that takes
as input the security parameter in the unary form 1λ and
outputs the secret substring search key k.
• SES← PreProcess(k, S ): This algorithm takes as inputs the
stream S and the secret key k and outputs the substring
encrypted data structure SES.
• tkT ,S ← SrchToken(k,T [1...m]): It is a probabilistic algo-
rithm that takes as input the secret substring search key k,
a string T [1...m] and outputs a trapdoor to search for the
string T on data stream S , through SES.
• (s,⊥)← Search(tkT ,S , SES): It is a deterministic algorithm
which takes as input a trapdoor tkT ,S and a substring en-
crypted structure SES and outputs the positions s in S that
substring T occurs, or ⊥ otherwise.
A substring searchable encryption scheme is correct if ∀λ ∈
N,∀S ∈ Σ,∀k ← KeyGen(1λ ),∀SES← PreProcess(k, S ),∀tkT ,S ←
SrchToken(k,T [1...m]), Search(tkT ,S , SES) always returns the cor-
rect positions s in the string S or ⊥ otherwise.
2.2 Security Model
Intuitively the security guarantee we ask for is 1) given a prob-
abilistic polynomial time adversary A with access to a sub-
string encrypted structure SES, A cannot gain more partial in-
formation about the underlying stream of data S and 2) given
a set of trapdoor tokens for an adaptively generated set of
queries q = (q1,q2,q3, . . . ,qo ) associated with set of tokens
t = (tk1, tk2, tk3, . . . , tko ) A cannot learn anything for q and t.
Following the symmetric searchable encryption paradigm we know
it is impossible to achieve those two security guarantees without
leaking some extra information as the observed in [5, 6, 8].
We express the security guarantees of the protocol in terms of
simutability [23]. First a leakage function L is defined, which ex-
presses the leakage of a S3E scheme to an adversary A, through
the transcripts of the protocol. The simulation framework assumes
two worlds. The RealS3EA (λ) world, whereby adversaries can corrupt
the parties they want and the IdealS3EA,S (λ) one in which there is
only benign behavior of each party. The security analysis narrows
down to the design of a simulator S, who tries to simulate the ma-
licious behavior in the IdealS3EA,S (λ) world, only through access to
the leakage function L. We say that a protocol is secure if S simu-
lates indistinguishable views of the adversaryA in the IdealS3EA,S (λ)
world.
The adversaryA plays the role of a semi-honest cloud and during
the two world we assume a challenger C who interacts withA. We
describe the two world in algorithmic details in what is follows:
RealS
3E
A (λ) world:
• C runs KeyGen(1λ ) to obtain k.
• A chooses a string S ∈ Σ, sends it to C and C replies with
SES← PreProcess(k, S ) to A.
• A issues a polynomial number of adaptively chosen queries
q = (q1,q2,q3, . . . ,qo ) and receives from C a set of tokens
t = (tk1, tk2, tk3, . . . , tko ).
• Finally A outputs v = (SES, t).
IdealS
3E
A,S (λ) world:
• A outputs a string stream S .
• The simulator S through the leakage L generates SES and
forwards it to A.
• A issues a polynomial number of queries q =
(q1,q2,q3, . . . ,qo ). S replies to each of the queries through
the leakage function L with t = (tk1, tk2, tk3, . . . , tko ).
• Finally A outputs v = (SES, t).
Definition 2.2. A substring searchable encryption scheme scheme
is adaptively L-semantically secure against a probabilistic polyno-
mial time adversary A if there is exists a polynomial Simulator S
such that for all polynomial time distinguishers D:
| Pr[D (v ) = 1 : v ← RealS3EA (λ)]−
Pr[D (v ) = 1 : v ← IdealS3EA,S (λ)]| ≤ neg(λ)
3 RELATEDWORK
Computing on encrypted data goes beyond linear and affine trans-
formations on numerical data held by an untrusted cloud. It is very
common for a single or multiple users to search on encrypted data
remotely. Under the scenario of remotely searching, new security
guarantees beyond confidentiality and integrity need to be con-
sidered. The so called search pattern reveals similarities between
search queries, and the access pattern leaks the identifiers or mem-
ory addresses of the accessed files–even encrypted [8].
The ORAM paradigm [16] enables a user to remotely search for
encrypted data, without leaking the search or the access pattern.
The trade off comes with a bandwidth and communication burden.
In [16] the bandwidth overhead is polylogarithmic, which has been
reduced down to logarithmic in subsequent work [10, 27, 31–33].
However, in order to provide a real practical real world remote
search protocol on encrypted data some leakages are allowed: the
search and access pattern. The formalization of these patterns has
been presented in the literature under the Symmetric Searchable
Encryption (SSE) framework [4–6, 8, 29], with efficient instantia-
tions.
With SSE a user encrypts data and index separately. It uploads
both to an untrusted cloud and later on can search efficiently file
identifiers with specific single keywords or an expressive boolean
function over keywords, without the cloud learning anything about
the files or the keywords. This comes at a security cost of leaking
the search and access pattern. Following the approach of SSE, we
can design substring searchable symmetric schemes as follows. The
user builds an index which maps substrings to positions, encrypts
the index and uploads it the the cloud. Later on, the user computes
a token for the specific substring and the cloud tries to find a match
in the index. If a match occurs the cloud returns the encrypted
positions for this token, which correspond to a substring. However,
this approach has increased storage cost O (n2), since the cloud has
to keep track of all the possible substrings.
Tailored substring searchable encryptions schemes have been
proposed in the literature [7], [12], [11]. Chase etal. [7] leverage
the auxiliary data structure of the suffix tree. A suffix tree is a
compressed suffix trie, can be computed in timeO (n) and allows for
substring search in O(m) time on a substring of sizem. Its amortized
storage cost O (n) hides a big constant factor, which could be equal
to 20 [1, 3, 17, 24]. In [11] the authors extended the efficient SSE
scheme for boolean queries from [4] in order to support substring
matching. The idea is to build an index of overlapping k-grams, to
prepend its relevant position and encrypt it. When a user needs
to perform a substring query, the cloud performs a conjunctive
keyword search for all the k-grams of the substring and returns
the position. The disadvantage of the scheme comes at the need
of storing all the overlapping k-grams at the cloud, which will
represent substrings.
In [12] the authors follow a different approach. Instead of taking
the index-then-encrypt approach with fast symmetric cryptographic
primitives, they modify the subset sum problem, which is used to
build public key encryption schemes, in a means such that the
cloud can solve it. This technique hides also the search pattern but
comes at the cost of fixed size substrings, that must be defined in
the beginning of the protocol. Moreover the substring should be
substantially small with respect to the big stream. Our solution in
contrast allows variable size of substring of any size.
Recently, Blass and Moataz [26] strengthen the security require-
ments by hiding the search and access patterns, following the
ORAM approach. By leveraging the Path ORAM technique and
the suffix array construction for substring queries, the authors man-
age to reduce the bandwidth, with a binary recursive tree above
the position map. Each node in the tree represents a Path ORAM of
the binary search tree for the suffix array. However, in order the
cloud to be able to perform an oblivious binary search has to keep
track of all the suffixes, which blows up the storage cost for the
server. Furthermore the need for storing the suffixes cancels out
the suffix array storage advantage over suffix tree. Finally, due to
the Path ORAM technique the user has to store a state logarithmic
on the length of the string–for the position map. The extra security
guarantees of the tailored ORAM scheme do not allow for efficient
storage cost both at the client and the cloud side, which is the goal
for our work. Sanders etal. [30] presented a public key substring
searchable encryption, where the underlying substring algorithm
is a variant of Rabin-Karp algorithm, thus suffering from linear
substring search time. It is noteworthy though to mention that
their goal is to decouple keyword generation from the encryption
of data in order to allow searches even when the underlying text is
not known when the index is built.
Papadopoulos etal. [28] addressed the problem of authenticating
substring queries without privacy and various work for pattern
matching adopts the two party computation model [9, 14, 18, 19] in
which one party holds the data stream and a client the pattern. The
model differs from the substring searchable symmetric encryption,
since in the latter one client holds both the pattern and the stream
and uploads an index of the stream to an untrusted party.
4 PRELIMINARIES
In order to reduce the storage cost for our Substring Searchable
Symmetric encryption scheme (S3E) we first substitute the storage
expensive suffix tree of the state of art work in [7] with a suffix array
SA. A suffix array for a string S of size n constitutes of an integer
array of size n, which has at each position a pointer to the start of
the matched suffix T [1...m] in the string S . SA is lexicographically
sorted with respect to all the possible suffixes and can be computed
in linear time on the size of the string S . In order to look for the
position of a substring, a binary search in SA is performed, which is
used as an index to the original string. Thus, the running time for
a substring search is O (m + loдn). Let us now consider a concrete
example to uncover its details. Suppose S=lalakis. The algorithm
for the suffix array proceeds as follows:
(1) Compute all the suffixes starting from the right-most posi-
tion: s, is, kis, akis, lakis, alakis, lalakis.
(2) Lexicographically sort the suffixes: akis, alakis, is, kis, lakis,
lalakis, s.
(3) Find the position in S of each suffix from step 2 and store
them in an array SA = [4, 2, 6, 5, 3, 1]
(4) Output SA.
However, plugging the SA for a substring searchable symmetric
encryption scheme raises some difficulties. We assume that the
suffix array is encrypted under a secret key of the user. In order
to retrieve the correct encrypted index position from SA, the cloud
should run a binary search obliviously without learning the under-
lying string S , query substring T , or any of the suffixes. A solution
to the problem is to use the technique presented by Gentry etal.
[15], which allows for a single ORAM query in order to perform a
binary search over encrypted data. However, in order to adapt this
approach it is required from the server apart from the encrypted
suffix array, to store the tree of the encrypted data, which would
be an extra burden for its storage complexity.
We take advantage of the self-indexed data structure Ferragina-
Manzini index, called hereafter FM index [13]. Namely, from FM
index the untrusted cloud can answer substring queries by lever-
aging the suffix array SA, without the need for an ORAM query.
The neat property of the FM index is that it can reconstruct the
original string S with some extra auxiliary data structures, thanks
to its instantiation from the Burrows-Wheeler Transformation algo-
rithm (BWT) [3]. For the reconstruction it employs the LF mapping
technique, thus there is no need to store the encrypted stream S .
The FM index can be derived from SA, as such its computational
overhead is almost for free, after the computation of the suffix array.
We describe the core building blocks of the FM index in what it
follows.
4.1 Pattern matching
In this section we describe the compressed index FM, that will be
used for the construction of our Secure Pattern Matching (S3E)
protocol. The design lies heavily on the BWT transformation for
compression of bit-strings and on a special LF mapping for the
reconstruction of the original string from BWT. The BWT, along
with the LFmapping technique and some auxiliary information are
the basic blocks of the compressed index for substring queries.
4.1.1 BWT Transformation. The Burrows-Wheeler Transforma-
tion (BWT) transforms a stream of data by leveraging the entropy
of each character. In a nutshell, the data stream S is transformed
to an encodingW such that compression algorithms provide high
rate of compression. For ease of completeness we show the steps
to transform an original stream S toW with BWT in algorithm 1.
First, the algorithm appends the terminating symbol $ to the input
string S . Then, it builds the matrixW by permuting the symbol $.
At each iteration the permutation is appended as a new row to the
matrix W. Finally the rows ofW are sorted lexicographically in an
ascending way.
4.1.2 LF Mapping. The LF Mapping technique takes the first
F and last L columns from the BWT transformation and through
an iterative process (algorithm 2) reconstructs the original string S .
Starting from the first elements of each column from F and L, the
algorithm employees L as an index to the F column. Each time the
element of the L column is appended to a LIFO stack. The value
at the current position will be used as an index for the F column
for the next loop. An example is presented in figure 1. At the first
iteration the pointer indicates the first position in both columns
F, L. For the next iteration the L character ’s’ indicates the index
for the first column F, which can be found at its last position with
F[7] =s. The current character at the L column is appended to a
stack D. For the next iteration the current character at the L column
indicates the next index for the F column. The character i is pushed
Algorithm 1: BWT transformation
Input: String S
Output: BWT(S ) =W
l=length(S)+1;
S.append($);
i=0;
while i<l do
ri=rotate(s,$) // The rotate algorithm permutes the
characters of the original string and returns the permuted
string;
W.addrow(ri ) // It adds the permuted row from the previous
step to the matrix W ;
i + +;
end
return Sorted.W;
to the stack D. The procedure halts when the position at L is $.
Then the algorithm pops all elements from D and the initial string
S is fetched.
Algorithm 2: LFMapping
Input: First (F), Last column (L) from BWT
Output: S
D=0 // Initialize the stack D;
l=length.(F) // the length of F equals the length of L;
i=0;
while L[i]! = $ do
D.push(L[i]);
i=find.F[L[i]]// find.[] denotes the index number in array
[] that the element is. For instance find.F[’s’]=7 ;
while D! = \′0′ do
S=S+D.pop;
return S;
F L F L F L F L F L F L F L F L
$ s $ s $ s $ s $ s $ s $ s $ s
a l a l a l a l a l a l a l a l
a l a l a l a l a l a l a l a l
i k i k i k i k i k i k i k i k
k a k a k a k a k a k a k a k a
l a l a l a l a l a l a l a l a
l $ l $ l $ l $ l $ l $ l $ l $
s i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i
Figure 1: The LFmapping process is used to reconstruct the original
string S from the transformed one after applying the BWT opera-
tion. Starting with the $ sign from the F column, the mapping pro-
gressively reconstructs the entire string S. The last column L is used
as a “ladder step” to find the next ith index in the F column, which
in turn maps to the ith entry in the L column. The entire procedure
halts when L[i]==$
4.1.3 FM Index. Suffix array vanilla construction hasO (n2loдn)
asymptotic computational cost. This stems from the fact that the n
suffixes are first sorted by performing O (nloдn) comparisons and
each comparison has cost n. Linear time algorithms have been
designed by first constructing a suffix tree and then traversing it
with a depth first edge in lexicographical order. However, our goal
is to be storage efficient, meaning we want to eliminate the storage
cost of a suffix tree, which practically approximates a constant
factor of 20n [1, 3, 17, 24]. We pick up the skew algorithm [20] which
is a divide and conquer based algorithm and achieves linear time
construction. The approach of the skew algorithm is to recursively
divide the suffixes in three groups depending on the position pos
of all suffices: pos mod h,h ∈ {1, 2, 3} and then merge the result.
The FM consists of three column arrays. The first one is the F
column from the LF mapping, the second one is the L column,
which corresponds to the BWT(S ) and the last one corresponds
to the suffix array SA. SA contains at each row i , the position
in the original string S of the substring which corresponds to
the ith row of the W matrix obtained after applying the BWT
transformation. L = BWT(S ) can be computed with the formula
BWT(S )[i] = S[SA[i] − 1] from the suffix array. Furthermore for
the traversal of the LF mapping the unique ranking of each char-
acter in each F, L needs to be stored in rF, rL accordingly. Finally
FM = {F[i], L[i], rF[i], rL[i], SA[i]}ni=1.
The entire challenge is on how a user encrypts FM in such a
way that an untrusted cloud can correctly reply with the encrypted
position on substring queries. We give the cryptographic tools
that we use in our protocol in the next subsection. We give an
intuition of our approach in the next section, we also highlight
some shortcoming thereof and we demonstrate our solution to
alleviate it.
4.2 Cryptographic Primitives
4.2.1 Pseudorandom functions (PRF). Let the family of all func-
tions in the universe from a domainX to a rangeY to be Func[X ,Y ].
A truly random function f $← Func[X ,Y ] is chosen randomly from
the set of Func . The set of all these functions is |Y | |X | (gigantic
number). It is true that for any random function f with range size
L chosen randomly from Func[X ,Y ], Pr[f (x ) = y] = 2−L . The
randomness is not parametrized neither by the size of X and Y
nor by the size of the domain. We define a pseudorandom function
fk : X → Y as a function from the set of all functions from X to Y
as soon as a particular key k is fixed.
Definition 4.1. Let Func={F : X → Y } be a function family for
all functions F that map elements from the domain X to the range
R. Then a PRF = { fk : X ′ → Y ′} ⊆ Func for k $← K , where K is the
key space.
The security of a PRF is modeled with a game which is known
as real or random security game[? ]. Intuitively, an adversary A is
given access to an oracle that on input x from a domain X , flips
a coin b $← {0, 1} and if b = 0 then it outputs y = f (x ), for f ∈
Func[X ,Y ], otherwise it outputs y = fk (x ).A issues queries to the
oracle polynomially many times on input of the security parameter
λ. Finally A outputs a guess b ′ for the bit b.
The advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A
in the PRF game is
AdvPRFA = Pr[b
$← {0, 1};b ′ ← A (y) : b ′ = b]
Definition 4.2. A PRF is computationally secure if all probabilistic
polynomially time algorithms A have advantage in the PRF game:
1
2 + ϵ (λ), for a negligible function ϵ on the security parameter λ.
4.2.2 Pseudorandom permutations (PRP). A permutation is a
bijective function where the domain and the range are equal. Sim-
ilarly with the random functions, let Perm[X ] to be the set of all
permutations for the domain X. Then a pseudorandom permutation
(PRP ) is a randomly chosen permutation from the set Perm[X ],
keyed under a secret key k .
The advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A
in the PRP game is
AdvPRPA = Pr[b
$← {0, 1};b ′ ← A (y) : b ′ = b]
Definition 4.3. APRP is computationally secure if all probabilistic
polynomially time algorithms A have advantage in the PRP game:
1
2 + ϵ (λ), for a negligible function ϵ on the security parameter λ.
4.2.3 Symmetric Key Encryption. A symmetric key encryption
scheme SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec} consists of three algorithms. Gen
takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs the secret key sk.
The probabilistic encryption algorithm E takes as input the secret
key sk and a plaintext x form the plaintext space P and outputs
the ciphertext c . The decryption algorithm SKE.Dec takes as input
a ciphertect form the ciphertext space C and the secret decryp-
tion key sk and outputs the plaintext x ∈ P. Correctness follows
⇐⇒ ∀sk ← Gen(1λ ), SKE.Dec((E(sk,x ))) = x ,∀x ∈ P. Secu-
rity is modeled with the standard game based indistinguishability
experiment for polynomial probabilistic time adversary A.
PrivKA,SKE (λ):
• A has access to the security parameter 1λ .
• A key sk ← Gen(1λ ) is generated and A can learn encryp-
tions of x of its choice x ∈ S ⊂ P.
• Eventually A outputs x0,x1 where |x0 | = |x1 |. b $← and
E(xb , sk) is returned to A.
• A outputs its guess for b, b ′.
If b ′ = b A succeeds and the experiment PrivKA,SKE (λ) = 1.
Definition 4.4. A symmetric encryption scheme SEK has indis-
tinguishable encryptions if the probabilities Pr[PrivKA,SKE (λ) =
1] ≤ 12 + neg(λ).
5 INTUITION
In this section we provide some intuition about S3E protocol before
delving into its precise description in the follow up section. First
we start with showing how the client encrypts the index to allow
the cloud process fast encrypted substring queries. Our solution
is based on the FM index described in the previous section. The FM
index consists of three arrays, which keep track of the F, L columns
and the encrypted SA suffix array with positions of substrings and
not all the suffixes as in [26]. To recap, the user computes the suffix-
array SA and the F, L columns through the BWT transformation.
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Figure 2: The encrypted FM index construction.
σ Vocabulary size
Σ Vocabulary
S Original stream
T Substring query
c character
b bucket
n Size of S
m Size of T
win window size
SA Suffix array
F First Column of LF mapping
L Last Column of LF mapping
LLSet Hash map
LL Linked List
cFj , bFj j
th character,bucket from F column
cLj , bLj j
th character,bucket from L column
rci , rbi Ranking of i
th character,bucket in the string S
rFj Ranking of j
th character from F column
rLj Ranking ofj
th character from L column
cw w th character, bucket from the alphabet, (1 ≤ w ≤ σ )
bz zth bucket,(1 ≤ z ≤ n − win + 1)
λ Security parameter
F( ·) Pseudorandom function (PRF)
Π( ·) Psudorandom permutation (PRP)
SKE = {Gen, Enc, Dec} Symmetric encryption
kf PRF key
kl PRF key
kπ1,2,3 PRP keys
Table 1: Notations
5.1 First Approach
We give an overview of our first approach. The protocol can be
described in two phases: The encrypted index phase and the search
phase.
5.1.1 Encrypted Index. To facilitate the reader we split the en-
crypted index process in two steps (cf. figure 2) the linked list, which
bootstraps the search procedure on the FM index by the cloud and
2) FM index itself. The notation used for the protocol is given in
table 1. For the security of the scheme the user employs lightweight
cryptographic primitives: a pseudorandom function F(·), a pseudo-
random permutation Π(·) respectively and a symmetric encryption
scheme SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec}. The untrusted cloud, thanks to the
LF mapping and the FM index computation does not need to store
all the suffixes of a stream S (cf. figure 2).
Linked List The crux of the design is on how to allow fast indexing
through a hash table, which means that there should be unique keys
derived from the string with repetitive characters. We employ the
ranking information rc of each character along with the character
itself. However, when a user is looking for a substring, it does
not know the ranking of each character in the substring T [1...m].
We mitigate this deficiency by building a linked list LLc for each
character.
The user computes a hash table of linked lists LLSet, where
each position LLSet[Fkf (c
w )], 1 ≤ w ≤ σ maps to the linked list
LLcw . The number of linked lists equals the number of distinct
elements c , denoted as σ in the data stream S , where each symbol
cw , 1 ≤ w ≤ σ comes from an alphabet Σ. The hash table is used to
fetch all the positions of a character in the stream S from the linked
lists LLcw . Each linked list LLcw stores information concerning the
retrieval of the position of c from S . More specifically each node in
the list stores the following tuple: ⟨nptr, addr⟩, nptr is a pointer
to the next node of the current list and addr is the address of the
element c in the FM index.
The first node of each linked list is stored in the LLSet hash
table. In order to prevent the adversary who tries to correlate ele-
ments from the LLSet with positions in the FM index, we further
encrypt each key Fkf (c
w ) in the LLSet hash map with another key
kl as follows: Fkf (c
w ) ⊕ Fkl (cw ). Thus the cloud cannot correlate
associations from LLSet to FM attack offline without observing any
token. The key of the hash map LLSet at Fkf (c
w ) ⊕ Fkl (cw ) maps
to the first element of the linked list LLc , which is encrypted as
⟨nptr, addr⟩ ⊕ Fkl (cw )1. As such, the frequency of each character
before a search query is hidden.
However, once the cloud receives queries, it can learn the fre-
quency of encrypted characters in the linked list which represent
characters of the string. In order to obfuscate frequency analysis on
the encrypted index from substring search queries, we pad the data
stream with dummy blocks. These dummy blocks make all linked
1Notice that even if we use a one time pad with the same key for two different elements:
a = ⟨nptr, addr⟩, b = Fkf (cw ) an adversary by xoring the two ciphertexts encrypted
under the same key Fkl (c
w ), learns ab = ⟨nptr, addr⟩ ⊕ Fkf (cw ), which is a one
time pad encryption of ⟨nptr, addr⟩ with key Fkf (cw ).
lists to appear with the same size. The core idea for padding is to
produce dummy blocks from the vocabulary Σ depending on the
ranking of the most frequent character. E.g: Original stream=abbcd
and Σ=abcd, then the dummy blocks equal dc={ a, c, d}. Finally
the user chooses uniformly at random dpos $← {|dc |} and appends
the original string S at position dpos of dc. Following the previous
example; if dpos=1 then S ′=aacdbbcd. The cloud responds in the
final round with the encrypted position pos . User accepts the result
as correct if dpos ≤ pos ≤ n − dpos and pos +m < dpos + n.
FM Index Encryption (figure 2). The second difficulty comes
when the cloud tries to traverse the FM index through the LF
mapping technique. The encrypted FM index contains unique di-
gests of characters, while the cloud should identify matches from
the token tkT ,S , that encodes repetitive characters deterministi-
cally. In order to allow the cloud traverse the encrypted FM in-
dex, we encrypt the FM as a key value hash table where the key
consists of Fkf (cFj ) ⊕ Fkf (rFj | |cFj ) and the value is Fkf (cLj ) ⊕
Fkf (rFj | |cFj ) | |Fkf (rLc j | |cLj ), E(posj ). Finally the user permutes all
the tuples with a secure permutation: Πkπ (tj ).
5.1.2 Search. During the Search phase on
a substring query tkT ,S = Fkf (T [1...m]) =
Fkf (T [1]), Fkf (T [2]), . . . Fkf (T [m]), Fkl (T [m]) the cloud proceeds
as follows:
Bootstrap. First it needs to bootstrap the search by finding the
correct candidate positions in the encrypted FM table through the
linked list, which correspond to all positions in the string S where
the last character of the query possibly exists. From the LLSet hash
table it looks for the value with key Fkf (T [m]) ⊕ Fkl (T [m]). This
value maps to a linked list LLc , in which each node maps to the
encrypted FM tuple tj = t0j , t
1
j , t
2
j =
⟨Fkf (cFj ) ⊕ Fkf (rFj | |cFj )︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
F
,
Fkf (cLj ) ⊕ Fkf (rFj | |cFj ) | |Fkf (rLc j | |cLj )︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
L
, E(posj )︸  ︷︷  ︸
SA
⟩nj=1.
In order to decrypt the first element of the linked list the cloud uses
Fkl (T [m]) as a key to decrypt ⟨nptr, addr⟩ ⊕ Fkl (cw ) and learns⟨nptr, addr⟩ . The cloud uses Fkf (T [m]) and applies a xor operation
on the F column at the ranges that it retrieved from the linked list
of the cm character LLc and learns Fkf (rFj | |cFj ).
Iteration. The cloud uses Fkf (rFj | |cFj ) as a key to decrypt the first
part of the L column element Fkf (cLj ) ⊕ Fkf (rFj | |cFj ) and reveals
Fkf (cLj ). It then fetches the encrypted L column as k = Fkf (cLj ),b =
Fkf (rLj | |cLj ) in which Fkf (cLj ) = Fkf (T [m − 1]) and for all nodes
from the linked list computes k ⊕ b, which is used as a key for the
F column. The procedure terminates when the processed substring
character is the first one Fkf (T [1]).
At this point the cloud returns to the user all the encrypted
E(posj ) for the substrings. The user decrypts and accepts the result
as long as the decrypted position is in the range of the size of
original stream without padding.
Second round. From the per-character one way function Fkf eval-
uation of the substring query: tkT ,S = C[1],C[2], · · · ,C[m] ←
Fkf (T [1...m]) and the LF mapping the protocol leaks to the cloud
in cleartext the exact differences of the positions of two en-
crypted substring in the stream S as long there are unique matches.
More specifically, the number of iterations in the LF mapping
traversal (algorithm 2), reveals how many positions two sub-
strings they differ, as long as there is unique match in S . Even-
tually, an untrusted cloud can decrypt the entire encrypted SA
array, which contains encrypted positions of all substrings in
S , since it knows its addresses. To circumvent the leakage we
first use two different permutations to permute the tuples tj :
Πkπ1 (t
0
j , t
1
j ) = π
0,1
j ,Πkπ2 (t
2
j ) = π
2
j . As such, after the permuta-
tion Fkf (cFj ) ⊕ Fkf (rFj | |cFj )︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
F
, Fkf (cLj ) ⊕ Fkf (rFj | |cFj ) | |Fkf (rLc j | |cLj )︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
L
are stored in position π 0,1j at the FM array and E(posj )︸  ︷︷  ︸
SA
at posi-
tion π 2j . The cloud as traverses the token returns the permuted
encrypted position of the substring token, the client applies the in-
verse permutation and fetches the correct cell from the FM array. By
doing so the cloud cannot learn on its own, the encrypted position
of a substring. The second permutation prevents him to learn this
information by stopping the traversal of the index at any substring
of the original query at its choice. To perform that, it needs the
contribution of the user. In part, the second permutation can be
viewed as the induced permutations of structured encryption [6],
which encrypt positions of items belonging a data structure, but
in contrast with structured encryption a user in substring queries is
interested to identify positions of sub-elements (substrings) of the
original data sructure and not the entire elements (e.g: positions of
elements in a matrix).
5.2 Improved scheme
5.2.1 Shortcoming. Recall that during the encryption of the
index, the user adds dummy blocks at the linked lists in order to
alleviate frequency attacks. Namely after issuing a query token
tkT ,S the client reveals to the cloud the key Fkl (T [m]) in order to
locate the head of the list which corresponds to the key Fkf (T [m])⊕
Fkl (T [m]). The cardinality of the list corresponds to the frequency
of that character in the original string S . In our first approach we
address this problem by adding dummy blocks in all linked lists in
order their size to equal the size of the longest one.
The aforementioned technique protects the client from frequency
attacks on the original string and imposes low overhead in case of
a string drawn from a distribution with homogeneous frequency
characters. However in a more skewed dataset with characters
having broad frequencies, then the technique of dummy characters
can drastically affect the efficiency of the system. More specifically
the dummy characters may double the size of the final size of the
index, thus degrading the storage overhead and the computational
efficiency of the client.
5.2.2 Bucketization of characters. Index. The entire procedure
is similar to the first approach but instead of operating on single
characters everything operates on buckets. Now the F and L column
arrays correspond to buckets and the input to the Fkf is not a single
character c but a bucket b. We use the same notation conventions
with the first approach but instead of operating on characters we
operate on buckets, i.e: we denote by b1 the first bucket of string,
bFj is the jth bucket of the F column, etc. The LLSet hashmap stores
for each key Fkf (b
z )⊕Fkl (bz ), the head of lists, which correspond to
buckets of the stream. The entire procedure to encrypt the index is
identical with our basic approach and we omit a repetitive overview
thereof.
Search. During the search phase if the size of the token, which
consists of possible consecutive buckets of the original string S ,
is a multiple of the windows size win then the protocol protocol
proceeds identically as with the per-character previous version of
the search procedure.
However when the size of the token is not multiple length of win
then there will be always a faulty mismatch. The possible match
of the last bucket of the token will be inside the last non-matched
bucket from the index. Recall that from the LF traversal on the FM
index, the search starts from the last character-bucket and proceeds
up to the first character-bucket of the search token. As such the
cloud during the search phase it will always misfire a mismatch. We
alleviate the correctness problem as follows. The cloud starts the
search not from the last bucket of the token Fkf (T [m]) but for the
previous one Fkf (T [m − 1]). If there is a match for allm − 1 blocks
of the token then the client needs to decrypt the mth bucket in
the string to verify matching of the first e = n mod win remaining
characters which correspond to the last bucket of the query token.
To do so the client has to encrypt and upload the stream S similarly
with [7] in a per bucket fashion resulting to an array of encrypted
buckets B. To avoid the leakage of the position the client permutes
the buckets with a pseudorandom permutation Π, keyed by kπ3 :
B′[j] = B[Πkπ3 (j )] and instead of querying for themth bucket it
forwards a request for bucket number B[Πkπ3 (m)]. It then decrypts
the bucket and compares it with the last bucket from the query to
identify a matching happening at positionm.
6 PROTOCOL
We give the full details of our substring searchable symmetric en-
cryption protocol, which alleviates the storage overhead shortcom-
ing of the first approach with our bucketization technique:
• k ← KeyGen(1λ ): This algorithm runs by the user takes as
input the security parameter 1λ and generates random keys
k = (kf , kl, kπ1,2,3 , ke,c) for a PRF Fkf : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}ν →
{0, 1}µ , a PRP Πkπ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν and a sym-
metric encryption algorithm SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec}. Finally
it outputs k to the user. For the generation of the keys we
assume a source of randomness R and a pseudorandom gen-
erator G seeded with
sf
$←R, sl $←R, sπ1,2,3
$←R, se $←R :
(kf , kl, kπ1,2,3 , ke,c) ← G(sf ),G(sl),G(sπ1 ),G(sπ2 ),G(se)
• SES← PreProcess(k, S ): User owns a stream S , which con-
tains characters c ∈ Σ. S has n characters. Let maxb be the
cardinality of most frequent bucket and fbi the frequency of
bucket bi . User:
(1) Parses the string S as buckets: {bz }n−win+1z=1 , each of size
win characters and k in total distinct buckets:
for z = 1; z + +; z = n − win
bz = (z + win ≤ |S |)?S[z...z + win] : S[z...n − z]
(2) Chooses dummy buckets dc = ∑kj=1 maxb − fbi that con-
stitute a dummy stream. The user chooses uniformly at
random dpos $← {|dc |} and appends the original string S
at position dpos of dc
(3) Computes the suffix array SA and the F, L columns on
input the buckets B and stores them as the FM index: FM =
F| |L, SA.
(4) Encrypts all buckest B = SKE.E(kc, bz ), 1 ≤ z ≤ n + k −
win + 1
(5) Permutes B′[j] = B[Πkπ3 (j )]
(6) Encrypts elements of SA array with SKE.E(ke, SA[i]), 1 ≤
i ≤ +k − win + 1.
(7) Applies the PRF to each element of F as follows:
F[i] = Fkf (bFi ) ⊕ Fkf (rFi | |bFi )
(8) Computes
L[i] = Fkf (bLi ) ⊕ Fkf (rFi | |bFi ) | |Fkf (rLi | |bLi )
(9) Applies a pseudorandom permutation Πkπ to the tuples:
t0 = Fkf (bFi ) ⊕ Fkf (rFi | |bFi ),
t1 = Fkf (bLi ) ⊕ Fkf (rFi | |bFi ) | |Fkf (rLi | |bLi )
using kπ1 and with kπ2 user permutes E(ke, SA[i]), for
i = 1, ...,n + k − win + 1 : Πkπ1 (t0i , t1i ) = π
0,1
i ,Πkπ2 (t
2
i ) =
π 2i = FM
′.
(10) For every distinct bucket in F[i] = Fkf (bFi ) ⊕ Fkf (rFi | |bFi )
the user initiates a linked list LLc and at each node stores
LLc .nptr for the next node of the list and LLc .addr which
points to the tuple ti with a matching Fkf (bFi ). Finally
it encrypts the first element of each linked list LLc with
Fkl (bi ) : ⟨nptr, addr⟩ ⊕ Fkl (bi ).
(11) Stores the head pointers of the collections of all linked
lists in a hash table LLSet with key k = Fkf (bi ) ⊕ Fkl (bi )
and value v a pointer to the head of the list LLc , which
stores information about the Fkf (bi ) character, meaning
all its positions to the encrypted FM index.
(12) Finally outputs SES = (LLSet, LLc , FM′,B′) and keeps only
the keys k = (kf , kl, kπ1,2,3 , ke,c).
• tkT ,S ← SrchToken(k,T [1...m]): This algorithm takes as
input the secret substring search key k, a stringT [1...m] and
outputs a trapdoor to search for the string T on data stream
S , through SES:
(1) Parse T [1...m] to buckets Tb = {T ib }m−wini=1 of size win:
for i = 1; i + +; i =m − win
T ib = (i + win ≤ |S |)?T [i ...i + win] : T [i ...m − i]
(2) User with his secret PRF key kf computes
tkT ,S = C[1],C[2], · · · ,C[m − win] ← Fkf (Tb =
{T ib }m−win−1i=1 ), Fkl (Tm−winb ) and forwards tkT ,S to the
cloud.
• (s,⊥)← Search(tkT ,S , SES): The cloud parses the token
query tkT ,S = C[1],C[2], · · · ,C[m − win] and searches the
position in S from the encrypted index SES as follows:
(1) if |tkT ,S | mod win == 0
x =m − win, flag = 0
else
x = m − win − 1, flag = 1 // Search for the last equal
size bucket pattern before the last one.
(2) u = f ind (LLSet,C[x])//find in dictionary LLSet the value
u with key C[x ].u is a pointer to the head of a list LL,
which stores pointers to all buckets T [m] in S
(3) if u ==⊥ return ⊥
(4) while u ,⊥ do
K = K ∪ u .addr //traverse the list and store in the set
K the addresses of the characters.
u = u .nptr
(5) for p = x − 1;p > 1;p = p − 2
for i = 1; i < size (K ); i + +
if SES.L[K[i]) (1) == C[p−1]//Store in the set KEYS
only the elements from the F column, whose associated L
element equals the next bucket from C in a backword order.
SES.L[K [i]](1) maps to Fkf (bLi ) ⊕ Fkf (rFi | |bFi ) and SES.L[K [i]](2)
to Fkf (rLi ).
KEYS = KEYS ∪ SES.L[K[i]]
else K = K − K[i] //Remove all the non matched
elements from the key set K.
if K ==⊥ return ⊥
for i = 1; i < size (KEYS ); i + +
rFi = C[p] ⊕ KEYS (1)[i]
z = rFi ⊕ KEYS (2)[i] //Compute the key from the
L column as KEYS (1)[i] ⊕ KEYS (2)[i], which corresponds to
Fkf (bFi ) ⊕ Fkf (rFi | |bFi ) in the F column of the SES object.
if SES.F[z] ,⊥
continue
else KEYS = KEYS − KEYS[i] //Remove all the non
matched elements from the key set KEYS.
K = KEYS
(6) if K ==⊥ return ⊥
(7) The cloud sends to the user SES.FM′[K]. The client runs
the inverse permutation Ππ2 to the K indexes and gets
back {i ′} and asks the cloud for SES.FM′[{i ′}]. After getting
back the results the client decrypts pos = E(ke, SA[{i ′}])
with ke and learns the position pos of the asked substring
T in S . In case flag == 0 user accepts the result as correct
if dpos ≤ pos ≤ n − dpos and pos +m < dpos + n.
(8) if flag == 1 recap that the LF traversal on the FM index
starts at the last character and proceeds invertly. Notice
that we excluded at step 1 during the else branch the re-
maining last bucket as it will always be a mismatch even
if the first characters match the user search pattern. So the
cloud returns also B’[pos]. The client runs the permutation
pos′ = Πkπ3 (pos) and asks the cloud to return the bucket
bpos ′ . Then client checks if the first m mod win charac-
ters of the decrypred bucket equals the lastm mod win
characters of the search pattern and accepts the pos as
valid otherwise discards the result.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We illustrate the security of the scheme pertaining to definition 2.2.
User splits the original data stream S in consecutive buckets of size
win by moving each time the window to the right one character.
More specifically, we show the existence of a simulator S, who has
access to the leakage function L and produces indistinguishable
views to an adversaryA. Conceptually the proof demonstrates that
an adversaryA, who can be a semi-honest cloud cannot learn more
information from what it can be leaked in an ideal work without
malicious behaviors. During the encryption of the index users write
to the LLSet linked list and to a three dimensional array FM. FM
consists of three columns: F, L from the BWT transformation, which
are used to traverse the string, and the SA column, which consists of
encrypted positions of the corresponding suffixes. To avoid leakage
of frequencies users pad each linked list LLSet. In order to impede
off-line traversal of the index, the user further encrypts the header
of each linked list. Moreover, two different permutations Πkπ1,2
are applied first on all the rows of the first two columns F, L and
then to the SA column to prevent an adversary from correlating
encrypted positions to intermediate results after having obtained a
token. I.e: without the permutation, A after obtaining a token can
stop the search to a substring of the queried substring and learn the
associated encrypted position from SA column. After A observing
LLSet and FM it learns the size of the padded string n′.
During the the search phase the adversaryA observes encrypted
tokens. Between two encrypted tokens A can identify similarity
in between two tokens: i.e: whether two identical token have been
issued, or identical encrypted buckets in between the tokens. Then
we point out two different cases:
(1) Size of token multiple of win: The user leaks to the cloud
howmanymatches exist in the string S for the queried token,
the encrypted cells at SA, which correspond to the matched
positions.
(2) Size of token not a multiple of win: The user in case
of a token, whose size is not a multiple of the size win
of each bucket, needs to verify the correctness of the po-
tential encrypted match(s). As such the cloud returns the
permuted possible position pos. User decrypts and applies
pos′ = Πkπ3 (pos) and asks the cloud to return the bucket
at position pos′. The cloud learns the encrypted position of
the last bucket of the token and its encrypted text.
Integrity guarantees of the data and the index are assured thanks
to the use of authenticated symmetric cryptography. Before stating
our theorem concerning the security of S3E we formally define our
leakage function L from our aforementioned analysis.
Definition 7.1. A leakage function L for a S3E scheme comprises
the following three leakage functions:
• PreProcess Leakage: L1 includes the padded size of the data
stream n′ >= |S |.
• SrchToken Leakage: The SrchToken Leakage L2 reveals the
length of the token |tk|, howmany common characters reside
in it and similarity patterns between different tokens.
• Search Leakage: L3 leaks how many times a substring token
tk exists in the padded string S with dummy blocks.
• Intermediate: Leakage L4 leaks intermediate addresses of
the F and L columns of a query.
• Access pattern: Leakage L5 leaks the addresses of the SA
cells for a fixed query.
To eliminate L2, . . . ,L5 leakage profiles an expensive ORAM
scheme can be used, however it is out of the scope of the paper, as
it will increase communication and storage overhead drastically.
Theorem 7.2. Let Fkf ,Πkπ , SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec} be a pseudo-
random function, a pseudorandom permutation, a semantically secure
symmetric encryption scheme respectively, then our substring search-
able symmetric encryption scheme S3E is adaptively L-semantically
secure.
Game Change Indistinguishability Argument
Game0 Game0 = RealS
3E
A (λ ) By definition
Game1 Replace Fkf , Fkl Pseudorandomness of Fkf
Game2 Replace Πkπ1,2,3, Pseudorandomness of Πkπ
Game3 Replace SKE = {Gen, Enc, Dec} Semantically secure SKE = {Gen, Enc, Dec}
Game4 Game4 = IdealS
3E
A,S (λ ) By definition
Table 2: Hybrid games
Theorem 7.3. Let Fkf ,Πkπ , SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec} be a pseu-
dorandom function, a pseudorandom permutation and a semanti-
cally secure symmetric encryption scheme respectively, then our sub-
string searchable symmetric encryption scheme S3E is adaptively
L-semantically secure.
Proof. (Sketch)
In the RealS3EA (λ) world (cf. 2.2) the adversary can obtain the
encrypted index and encrypted keywords of its choice. In the be-
ginning the Challenger selects the size of the buckets win and
uniformly at random keys k = (kf , kl, kπ1,2,3 , ke,c) for a PRF Fk :
{0, 1}λ × {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}µ , a PRP Πkπ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν
and a symmetric encryption algorithm SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec}.
Upon receipt of a stream S of size n, the Challenger employs the SES
← PreProcess(k, S ) as presented in section 6 and forwards SES to
A. We distinguish betweenmatchingqm and non-matching queries
qnm : q = ⋃qnmqm . We assume for the ease of readability that ad-
versary issues only matching queries qm . During the Search phase,
C has also access to L2=similarities between tokens, L3=# times a
token exist in the substring. C upon receipt of q checks in a table
QT whether q ∈ QT . If so C fetches the corresponding token tkT ,S
and forwards it to A. If this is the frist time for q then C computes
tkT ,S = C[1],C[2], · · · ,C[m] ← Fkf (T [1...m]), Fr (T [m]). FinallyA receives t = (tk1, tk2, tk3, . . . , tko ) for each substring query.
Within a sequence of hybrid games we show the indis-
tinguishable transformation of RealS3EA (λ) game to eventually
the IdealS3EA,S (λ) game, which concludes the proof. The sim-
ulator S computes the simulated encrypted index SES∗ =
(LLSet∗, LL∗c , FM
′∗) as follows:
• Game0: This game is equivalent with the RealS3EA (λ) game.
• Game1: This game behaves as the RealS3EA (λ) game with the
difference that S does not have access to S . The simulator
through the L1 leakage function builds the substring en-
crypted structure SES as follows: We assume the existence
of an algorithm S ← Build(n′, str ), which takes as input
n′ ∈ N and the structure str = {b}n′i=1, b ∈ Σ∗ and outputs
a bitstring of length n′, from a vocabulary Σ∗. Notice that
as in the real game the valid length of the original stream
is not revealed and only the length of the string after the
padding n′ is leaked. S selects uniformly at random keys
k = (kf , r , kπ , ke) for a PRF Fkf : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}µ ,
a PRP Πkπ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν and a symmet-
ric encryption algorithm SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec} and runs
SES← PreProcess(k,Build(L1)). S uses Fkf to evaluate bit
strings of length cn : L2 (q) = cn . For the simulation of the
tokens and its responses, S uses the leakage obtained from
L2 . . .L5.
• Game2: This game behaves similarly with Game1, but we re-
place the Fkf with a real random function which is evaluated
through access to an oracle ORF (λ, µ,ν ).
• Game3: This game behaves similarly with Game2, but we
replace the Πkπ with a real random permutation which is
evaluated through access to an oracle ORΠ (λ,ν ).
• Game4: In Game4 we replace the semantically secure SKE =
{Gen, Enc,Dec} with real random values by querying an
oracle ORE (λ).
We write Gamei ≈ Gamej to denote that the view of proba-
bilistic polynomial time adversary A is indistinguishable between
the output of Gamei and Gamej . Game0 = RealS
3E
A (λ) by definition,
Game1 ≈ Game0 as long as no collisions happen to the evaluation
of Fkf , Πkπ , SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec} or E, Game2 ≈ Game1 as long
as Fkf is indistinguishable from real random function, Game3 ≈
Game2 thanks to the indistinguishable output of Πkπ from real ran-
dom permutations, Game4 ≈ Game3 because of the semantically
secure SKE = {Gen, Enc,Dec} and finally Game5 = IdealS3EA,S (λ)
by definition.
□
8 PERFORMANCE
In this section we present our implementation results. We demon-
strate the practicality of S3E with benchmark experiments, com-
paring our results with the scheme of Chase et al. [7], in order to
validate the claims of our performance improvements. To accom-
plish the comparison we also implemented the suffix tree based
construction of [7] called hereafter ST.
8.1 Implementation
Our comparison is based on two metrics: a) storage overhead for
the encryption of the index and the computation of a substring
query as an encrypted token, b) computation time of each opera-
tion. The reported computation times for each experiment are taken
as the average of 100 trials. As we implemented both schemes on
the same machine, which simulates both the client and the server,
we can derive accurate and fair observations about the performance
of the protocols on real metrics. In the real world the server can
be implemented in a more powerful machine, however this does
not change the storage overhead or the computation performance
fraction of both schemes.
Thanks to our encrypted suffix array construction, we achieve
a storage improvement by a factor of 1.71 for the DNA sequence
data stream and 1.57 for the enron email data. This occurs first
because of the extra information a node of the suffix tree should
keep (leaf nodes, parent nodes, auxiliary information for the sub-
string of the path in the tree) and due to the dummy nodes policy,
which increases the size of the tree. Subsequently that affects the
computation time for the computation of the encrypted index with
a ≈ 4x blowup on average for data sets of size 106.
8.2 Benchmarks
8.2.1 Index. In tables 3,4, we depict the storage and computa-
tional overhead incurred by the computation of the encrypted index
using the suffix array in S3E using different window sizes for the
buckets and the suffix tree in ST scheme of [7].
We observed an increased overhead in the size of the encrypted
index for the ST scheme [7], compared with ours as expected. On
average, over all the the data sizes, for different data sets the gain of
S3E over ST approximates a factor of 1.64. However, for realistic big
data streams consisting of 106 the gain reaches a factor of 2. Even
though the computation of the encrypted index happens only once,
the storage overhead incurred by its encryption is of more crucial
importance than its computation time. A limited storage device is
not capable of computing the encrypted index if that comes at an
increased communication overhead.
We also measured the computation time of the encrypted index
in both schemes in tables 3, 4. The S3E index construction time
outperforms ST. Apart from the extra dummy blocks and the in-
creased size of the suffix tree compared with that of a suffix array,
the increased computation cost stems from the way ST encrypts
the suffix tree.
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Figure 3: Token storage overhead for both schemes in DNA streams.
As the window size affects very epidemically the encryption of our
query we use a fixed window size: win = 25
8.2.2 Query Encryption. We run experiments in order to com-
pute the storage overhead during the SrchToken phase. The token
consists of a sequence of buckets from a vocabulary: be it charac-
ters from emails or characters from DNA sequence. As the query
encryption is not affected by the distribution of the underlying
characters and for compactness we choose to present results only
from the DNA sequence. We also observed tiny differences at the
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Figure 4: Token computation time for both schemes inDNA streams.
As the window size affects very epidemic the encryption of our
query we use a fixed window size: win = 25
query encryption time and the size of the bucket. We observe a
reasonable increase in both the size of the encrypted query (fig-
ures 3,4) and its computation time as the query size increases. S3E
outmatches in query computation time due to the way the query
is encrypted in ST scheme: Namely for each character 2 PRF, and
one block cipher is invoked, while in S3E only one PRF is invoked.
The storage overhead of ST also outgrows faster since the sub-
string is encrypted recursively and not by character. That is, the
token: T [1],T [2], ...,T [m] is encrypted as ct1 = PRF1 (T [1]),k1 =
PRF2 (T [1]), ct2 = PRF1 (T [1]T [2]),k2 = PRF2 (T [1]T [2]) and so on.
Finally the client forwards to the cloud: {Encki (cti )}mi=1.
64 128 256 512
Query size in characters
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ti
m
e 
se
co
nd
s
|10^6| dataset 
|10^5| dataset
|10^4| dataset
Figure 5: Response time for S3E scheme in a DNA stream. Time is
measured as the average over different bucket sizes: 2, 23, 25
8.2.3 Response Overhead. In figures 5, 6 we discern a slight
outperformance of S3E compared with ST in terms of substring
response time. For the experiments we computed tokens of various
lengths and perform a search on DNA streams of different sizes.
Dataset #Characters
102 103 104 105 106
Storage Time Storage Time Storage Time Storage Time Storage Time
DNA 60KB 0.44s 567KB 1.07s 6.4MB 9.66s 63MB 89.50s 589MB 1382s
Enron 57KB 0.42s 562KB 0.97s 6.3MB 9.07s 62MB 85.74s 579MB 1268s
Table 3: [7] Index storage and computational overhead for variable size data sets.
Dataset #Characters
102 103 104 105 106
Storage Time Storage Time Storage Time Storage Time Storage Time
DNA
win = 2 37KB 0.26s 410KB 49s 4.2MB 3.50s 42MB 29.90s 456MB 728s
win = 23 38KB 0.15s 401KB 48s 4.1MB 3.46s 40MB 29.78s 410MB 683s
win = 25 29KB 0.11s 371KB 43s 3.7MB 2.34s 37MB 26.12s 373MB 640s
Enron
win = 2 40KB 0.29s 402KB 50s 4.1MB 3.69s 41MB 30.65s 471MB 702s
win = 23 38KB 0.17s 396KB 46s 4MB 3.42s 40MB 29.23s 401MB 678s
win = 25 29KB 0.10s 385KB 42s 3.7MB 2.56s 37MB 27.50s 372MB 630s
Table 4: S3E Index storage and computational overhead for variable size data sets and buckets window size.
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Figure 6: Response time for ST [7] scheme
The client computes and encrypts the index and uploads it to the
cloud. The cloud simulated in the same machine runs the search
algorithm, and we computed the total search time. We perceived in
both schemes, that for considerable smaller than 106 elements the
running time tends to be independent on the size of the substring
token. For a one million data stream there is a notable increased
response time compared with the smaller data sets and there is
a proportional increment in time with respect to the size of the
token. In exact times, S3E surmounts ST [7] for the computation of
the response at the cloud side. This outperformance is due to the
increased size of the encrypted index in [7] with dummy blocks,
based on a suffix tree data structure.
9 COMPARISON
We perform a comparison of our S3E with existing solutions (cf.
table 5). We analyzed the search running time in asymptotic com-
plexity, index space requirements both in the plaintext and in the
ciphertext space, query size, variable length capability, rounds of
communication and search leakage. Since our scheme competes
mostly with [7] here we further elaborate its cost analysis from
table 5.
Search. Thanks to the usage of encrypted dictionary the cost of
searching am length string isO (m+k ), wherek denotes the number
of occurrences. However, due to the extra dummy blocks the search
cost is increased to O (m + k +∑kj=1 (maxb − fbi )), where maxb is
the most frequent bucket and fbi the frequency of bucket bi .
Index. For the index space complexity, we analyzed the space
requirement in the plaintext space and in the ciphertext space. For
the plaintext space analysis we assume, that a pointer or integer
requires 4 bytes. Recall that a suffix tree has n leaves, at most n − 1
internal nodes and at most 2n−2 edges. Thus, for a naive suffix tree
implementation we need 2 pointers for each leaf: one for the parent
node and one for its position to the original stream, resulting in
8n bytes. Four pointers for each internal node: one for the parent
node, one for each leftmost child, one for the right sibling and one
pointer for the suffix link, which reduces the search time during
a substring query. The total storage cost for the internal nodes is
4 ∗ 4n = 16n. For each edge, suffix trees allocate one pointer for
the beginning position of the substring in the stream and one for
the end position of the substring in the stream increasing the space
cost to 24n + 4 ∗ 2 ∗ 2n = 40n. The space cost of the solution based
on suffix trees [7] can be further reduced to 20n by eliminating the
need to store suffix links and parent pointers. However, the extra
dummy blocks further augment the storage overhead. Assuming a
suffix tree withN internal, each node is further paddedwith dummy
children nodes so as to each node has σ children, where σ is the
size of the vocabulary. Furthermore, the internal nodes are padded
with up to 2n − 2 nodes where n is the size of the string. Finally the
size of the extra dummy nodes in [7] is: Σ2n−(2+N )i=1 (σ − child (i )),
where child (i ) equals the number of children for internal node i in
the suffix tree. In contrast, in S3E we replace the space expensive
suffix trees with suffix arrays and as such the index space cost is
reduced from 20n bytes to 4n bytes.
For the storage space computation during the encryption of the
index, be it suffix tree or suffix array, we exclude a per byte com-
parison and we assume a ciphertext comparison. The encryption
of the index is based on the translation of the suffix tree to an en-
crypted dictionary. Thus, all the extra pointers of the suffix tree
Protocol Search Index [PS|CS] Query [FR|LR] VLS Rounds SL
CS[7] O (m + k ) 20n 4(n + Σ2n−(2+N )i=1 σ − child (i )) m (m+1)2θ m+k ✓ 3 SP+QPP+IIP+LIP
FJKNRS[11] O (n) - m 0 ✓ 1 SP
FHV[12] O (n −m) - m 0 ✗ 1 ✗
S3E O (m + k ) 4n 4(n +∑kj=1 maxb − fbi ) m 1 ✓ 2, 3 SP+QPP+IIP
Table 5: Comparison of existing substring searchable encryption protocols. Index space is further categorized in plaintext space index storage
space (PS) and ciphertext space (CS). The overhead of [11] and [12] is undefined as the schemes do not take advantage of any auxiliary data
structure for efficient substring search. For the query complexity we analyzed its size in terms of two separated phases: at the first round (FR)
of the protocol and the last one (LR), in case of multiple rounds protocols. VLS denotes variable length substring search and SP the search
patternleakage: QPP: Query prefix pattern, IIP: Index intersection pattern, LIP: Leaf intersection pattern.
are excluded. Following the protocol from [7], the user encrypts 2n
substrings which are equal to the number of edges of the suffix tree
plus n leaves and n characters of the original stream, resulting in
4n encryptions. In our solution thanks to the FM mapping the user
sends the encrypted suffix array, plus two more n size arrays for
the FM index construction; one for the F column of the index and
one for the L column. In the end it uploads 4(n +∑kj=1 maxb − fbi )
encrypted values to the cloud, in total.
Query. For the query size, we assume a block cipher of size θ
and a substring query of sizem. In [7] the substring is encrypted
incrementally: for the substring “abc” user encrypts separately E(a),
E(ab), E(abc). As such, for big substring queries as in DNA queries,
the number of ciphertexts exceeds the number of the substring
m. The total number of encryptions equals 1θ +
2
θ + · · · + mθ =
m (m+1)
2θ during the first round. At the last round the user asks for
the positions of each character separately augmented by a factor
of m the substring size. In S3E the substring query has only per
character encryptions of each character in the first round plus a
ciphertext for the last round. Our solutions also allows variable size
substring queries, since the size of the substring query is decoupled
from the scheme and can be defined online during the query phase
as in [7].
Rounds. Regarding the rounds of communication, S3E can return
the substring search results in 2 rounds of communication or in
3 when the query size is not a multiple of the bucket size win.
During the first round, the client sends an encrypted substring
query and the cloud responds with the encrypted addresses of the
corresponding suffix array positions. At the second round the client
decrypts the permuted position of the suffix tree and asks the cloud
for the unpermuted encrypted position. A third round is performed
when a query is not a multiple of the size of the bucket, whereby
the client verifies the correctness of the possible match.
Security Leakage. Concerning the search leakage, Chase et al. [7]
scheme leaks the search pattern, meaning an untrusted could can
identify similarities between two or more substring search queries.
Moreover, the scheme reveals the query prefix pattern, which leaks
whether a node has been visited for a previous substring in the
suffix tree, the index intersection pattern which allows the cloud
to learn if the returned index position has already been asked and
finally, the leaf index leaks when any of the returned positions
of the tree leaves have been previously queried. Since in S3E we
avoid the use of a suffix tree, S3E does not leak the leaf pattern.
We inherit though, the index intersection pattern, which reveals
if any returned index has been returned in a previous query. As
in [7] our scheme reveals also the cloud differences of the indexes
when a user asks for substrings that they do differ in one position
and there is only a single position in the original stream S . Both
schemes employ a padding policy to add dummy blocks in order
to obfuscate the structure of the index and the stream. S3E is also
adaptively secure under the real-ideal simulation paradigm. We
also use an authenticated encryption scheme in order to assure the
integrity of the messages.
10 CONCLUSION
We designed and analyzed a substring searchable symmetric en-
cryption protocol S3E, which achieves better storage performance
than state of the art work [7]. The idea of our protocol is to lever-
age the self-indexing mechanism of FM index, which stores only n
integer positions of its substrings. Our protocol is provably secure
under the real-ideal paradigm. We also implemented our protocol
and compared it with the state of the art work [7], showing its
notable performance improvement in terms of storage overhead
and computation time.
As part of future we will investigate solutions for substring
queries on encrypted data, which further reduce the search time
by tolerating accuracy. This is achieved with approximation algo-
rithms. To the best of our knowledge, at the time of this writing, the
literature has not addressed how to perform approximation queries
for substring queries on encrypted data. Moreover, we seek to look
for solutions, which scale better in terms of computational time
by leveraging parallelization: Due to the large amount of data pro-
duced in the stream of a DNA sequence, the client may outsource
the task of computing the FM index in different servers, each one
holding a portion of the data stream. It is becoming challenging how
those servers can compute the encrypted index. Recent progress
in the area of algorithms has shed some light [36], but tweaking
the algorithms to operate on encrypted data without leaking more
than it is accepted, needs further research.
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